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LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN RELATION TO
NATIONAL CRIME
Address of
J. EDGAR HOOVER, Director,FederalBureau of Investigation,
U. S. Department of Justice, before the Sheriffs and Peace
Officers Association of Oklahoma, at Tulsa,
Oklahoma, January 13, 1936
T IS especially pleasing to me to address you gentlemen,

the Sheriffs and Peace Officers of Oklahoma. I have long

been eager for an opportunity to discuss with you a common basis the various problems which arise in the enforcement of law and apprehension and detection of criminals.

While the crime problem is primarily local, yet it bears elements which make it a potential national menace. We must
regard all crime no matter how petty as a thing of major
importance; we must look upon any infraction of the law
as a possible local firebrand which may have its reactions
throughout the country. Crime no longer is a menace of
purely municipal, county or state limitations. Like the prairie
fires which once swept this region, starting from a tiny blaze
and raging with the first sweep of the wind into instruments
of major disaster, crime of today may begin with a petty
infraction, and within seemingly insignificant space of time,
encompass every form of outlawry.
I have in mind a number of cases which no doubt are
familiar to all of you. There is the instance of Wilbur Underhill, who began as a petty bootlegger, who went from this to
thievery and burglary, and progressed onward along the path
of crime to multiple murder, all within the space of a few
years. I remember "Pretty Boy" Floyd, who also started as
a petty larceny law evader, and who ended that career after a
reign of terror as one of the most feared desperadoes of America. The history of practically every criminal of major importance who has come to the attention of you gentlemen of law
enforcement has a background of minor juvenile and even
adult infractions. Therefore, each one of these men and, I
must add, some women, forms a living comparison to the
simile which I drew of the prairie fire. A spark, a tiny blaze,
and then wholesale destruction.
The part which the local officer plays in national en141
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forcement is a tremendous one. It is his job to attempt to
stamp out these sparks and failing in that, to extinguish the
blaze before it gets beyond control. That there are instances
when these attempts fail does not, to my mind, mean that
there has been inefficiency, that there has been a lack of interest, or a fading of enthusiasm for the upholding of the law.
It brings into the picture certain malignant elements which we
all must recognize and which we all must band together in a
concerted effort to eradicate. I refer particularly to the stultifying influence of politics.
Time after time, as all you gentlemen know, courageous
officers have arrested young men and young women, charging
them with some minor or major offense. A case has been
carefully worked up, there is sufficient evidence for a conviction, and certainly sufficient reasons why this culprit should
be made to realize that, after all, the law should be a majestic
thing, and that crime should not be countenanced in the community. However, almost immediately, this honest officer
finds himself embroiled in the efforts of numerous individuals
whose main desire is not to see that justice is done, not to protect the community against infractions of the law, not to
assist officers sworn to uphold their duty, but, through the
efforts of some none too honorable attorneys, through the
power of the vote, through the influence of local and state
politicians, to nullify every effort which has been put forth by
the law enforcement officials. We find that this attempt to
veto the law proceeds throughout all efforts which are made
to adequately teach the lesson that crime should not pay. Its
malignant influence creeps into the courts, it creeps through
the bars of the penitentiaries, it makes its insidious way into
the meetings of pardon and parole boards, and it practically
places a medal of honor upon the man who can defeat the law
and get away with it. I believe that one of our greatest duties
is to give the widest publicity to the efforts of politicians who
seek to degrade law enforcement. I believe that there are
enough honest citizens in our communities who, if they knew
the truth about this tremendous pressure of gangrenous politics upon the most important phase of our lives-the protection and happiness of our homes-that a revolt would come
about giving the law enforcement officer the freedom he needs
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in pursuit, detection, apprehension, and punishment, and the
peace of mind which should be his, but which never can exist
so long as he is harried by politicians who constantly threaten
him should he have the temerity to arrest or attempt to prosecute a person under their protection. In such instances of
local crime violations we have that spark and tiny flame about
which I have spoken and which later leads to the sweeping
destruction of the prairie fire.
I have mentioned local cases because they are excellent
examples of what I desire to show. "Pretty Boy" Floyd, for
instance, in the first analysis, was a local criminal; in the final
analysis, he was a potential menace to all of America, and
thus the problems which I discuss with you are of vital interest to everyone throughout the United States, for what applies in Oklahoma applies equally from the Atlantic to the
Pacific, and from the Gulf of Mexico to Canada. The problem everywhere is the same-small-time criminals of today
become the dangerous public enemies of tomorrow. The
scope, the magnitude of crime as it exists reaches staggering
figures. Last year in the United States there was an estimated
total of 1,445,581 serious crimes. May I repeat that-in one
year alone almost one and a half million major crimes were
committed against the citizens of this country. In other
words, there was crime of desperate proportions-auto theft,
burglary, aggravated assault, robbery, rape, manslaughter,
and murder--committed against one of every 84 persons in
this country, and few indeed were the criminals who did not
begin in some petty way.
Returning to "Pretty Boy" Floyd, we find him at first
confining his efforts to the small town in which he lived, then
his activities spread to the country, then he sallied forth into
various parts of the state. He moved into Missouri, into Kentucky. We find him going onward into Ohio, back down to
Arkansas, further to New York State, ranging over thousands of miles, even as a predatory animal ranges over a game
trail. All of us know only too well that there is a beaten track
of criminality moving from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border, with side shoots which often reach to the coastlines of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Crime, when it becomes
a truly predatory affair, knows no boundaries. However, the
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harassed officer who must pursue that criminal finds himself
blocked by statutes and laws at city, county or state lines.
Therefore, in the apprehension of these depredatory characters, it becomes necessary to overcome almost insurmountable
obstacles. If the pursuit by an officer must stop at a county
line, then indeed law is outwitted unless the officer of the next
county takes up the chase, and the officers of other states assist,
plus the action of such organizations as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, of which I am proud to be the head. The old
adage of the chain being no stronger than its weakest link is
here exemplified. Let cooperation falter, and the chase indeed
becomes a difficult one.
I am proud indeed to say that the cooperation of local,
county and state law enforcement officials of Oklahoma with
the representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has
been of the highest order. We in the Bureau feel our task
often is much easier with gentlemen such as yourselves than it
is in several large metropolitan areas where the heavy hand of
politics is constantly at work, where petty jealousies are allowed to interfere with absolute efficiency, and where publicity-seeking officials sometimes find a greater reward in seeing
their names in the paper than they do in knowing that an arch
criminal has been brought to justice. We remember with
affection and deep regard the magnificent record of Chief Olin
Reed of McAlester, Oklahoma, who gave his life in the cause
of cooperation.
There was no order or command which sent Olin Reed
to assist the Federal officers who made the arrest of Frank
Nash at Hot Springs. Arkansas. There was no greed for
notoriety. There was no impelling urge of political expediency. Chief Reed knew Frank Nash by sight. He felt that he
could render a service to the people of the United States by
pointing out to the Federal officers this man whose field of
crime, incidentally, had encompassed most of America. So, as
a fellow officer he went along, and as a fellow officer he fell
beside Federal Agents and local police under the vicious assault
of gangster impelled machine gun bullets at the Union Station
Plaza in Kansas City, and as a fellow officer, we revere him
and respect his memory.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation believes that the
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secret of crime eradication lies in solidarity and the combined
linking of all law enforcement agencies. Much already has
been done along this line, and with every forging of a new
link in this chain of cooperation, we find an added impetus in
the war against the criminal.
Until several months ago, the chasing down of a bank
robber was wholly a local affair. This often meant that the
task fell upon a community which could ill afford the tremendous expense necessary in these days to continue a pursuit
which might last for years and extend through numerous
states. Then, Congress passed a law which allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to cooperate with local law enforcement officials in the running down of predatory criminals
who commit offenses against National and Federal Reserve
System banks. In a comparatively short time, the number of
robberies has taken a drop of more than fifty per cent. In
other words, cohesion has been developed, a working arrangement by which both local and Federal enforcement agencies
may pool their interests upon a common pursuit, and I am
indeed proud of what has been accomplished.
In this connection, may I direct your attention to the
phenomenal growth of the Identification Division of the Bureau which owes its existence to the wholehearted cooperation
of such persons as yourselves. This Identification Division is
not some mysterious affair which takes fingerprints out of
thin air. They come from the crossroads of America, from the
villages, from the towns, cities and metropolitan centers, to be
concentrated in Washington, and there to form a vast cross
index of over five million five hundred thousand evidences of
law infraction-waiting always to bring to justice the man
who tries to outwit the forces of law enforcement. This is a
partnership, a contract by which a law enforcement official
agrees to furnish honestly and efficiently the fingerprints of
persons who are arrested in his district. In return for this,
payment is made by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
the careful, honest and efficient filing of these fingerprints and
the watchfulness necessary to immediately identify similar
fingerprints should they come in from any part of America.
Thus, the man who is a fugitive from Tulsa is identified in
St. Paul. An escape from Leavenworth is found in New
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York, and so on, not only throughout America, but throughout the world, for identifications have been made on arrested
persons from as far away as Cairo, Egypt, and British South
Africa.
Moreover, a new and strong partner of law enforcement
is growing up in Washington, the Crime Laboratory, where
experts in chemistry, ballistics, and other forms of scientific
detection and pursuit are at the service of localities. I hope the
time will come when the services of the charlatans or so-called
professional experts who appear as witnesses solely for the
money involved, may become a thing of the past. The Crime
Laboratory of the Federal Bureau of Investigation has no
opinions other than those which are the results of the application of cold, mathematical science. It reports innocence as
well as guilt, and there is no power-monetary, political or
otherwise-which can cause it to deviate from that process.
Continuing its desire to place every possible aid in the
hands of efficient law enforcement officers, there has been built
up in our Bureau a single fingerprint file of the known public
enemies of this country, thus making identification swiftly
possible in the event of major crimes committed by persistent
offenders.
I feel that justice should be rendered where justice is due,
particularly in the field of law enforcement, and in speaking
as modestly as possible of the work of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, I conceive it proper to say that the results of
our work have in great measure been made possible by the
splendidly enthusiastic and far-sighted interest, support and
encouragement of the Attorney General of the United States,
the Honorable Homer S. Cummings, whose greetings I bring
you today. At the inception of his incumbency as Attorney
General he made it clear that the work of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation must be carried on without regard to any
outside, complicating interests, political or otherwise. His
keen mind instinctively grasped the necessity for more comprehensive legislative measures and he has labored ceaselessly,
both in the legislative and administrative fields, for the success
of the Bureau's crusade to combat criminals and suppress the
major manifestations of crime which constituted such a grave
menace to the entire country when he first became Attorney
General.
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With cooperation between local officials and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in the crime situation, there enters the
need of a third ingredient, the cooperation of the law-abiding
citizen. All of us have seen cases fail, not because officers have
been negligent in their duties, not because courts have not been
couragous, but because the very person who should be the
most eager volunteer in the war against crime has proved
either cowardly or apathetic. I have in mind one case in which
there were many witnesses to a murder. Try as he would, the
County Prosecutor in that case could not persuade a single
one of those witnesses to go into court and testify against the
slayer. It is a matter of record that crimes or threats of crime
have been concealed by the victims who preferred to suffer in
silence rather than solicit the aid of law enforcement bodies. I
submit that we who are entrusted with law enforcement cannot be mind-readers. We must be informed of the crime,
otherwise we cannot pursue the actual or potential criminal.
In this regard, I wish to emphasize that when such information comes to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it is speedily and thoroughly investigated. Since kidnaping became a
Federal offense, 62 actual cases of kidnaping or threats to
kidnap have come to the attention of this Bureau. Not one of
these remains unsolved, and a case in particular, that of
Charles F. Urschel of Oklahoma City, gives me an opportunity to illustrate exactly what I mean by quick and proper
notification plus thorough cooperation as a major factor in
the solution of a crime.
Within a few minutes of the time that Mr. Urschel was
seized at his home, recourse had been taken to the emergency
kidnaping number of National 7117 at Washington, and the
news of the crime flashed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Immediately Special Agents of the Bureau were rushed
by airplane or speedy automobile from various parts of the
country to concentrate their efforts, working in collaboration
with local officers, and starting from the place of the offense
in Oklahoma City. I cannot praise too highly the aid which
was given by local law enforcement bodies. The trial which
began at Oklahoma City moved into Texas where invaluable
aid was given by astute members of a Texas Metropolitan
Police Force. From Texas, it spread to an expanse of the
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United States greater than that of continental Europe, and led
to the wiping out, not only of a kidnap band, but of all the
roots of crime which had supported this band. Persons who
had harbored the criminals were taken before the bar of justice. Others who had assisted them in hiding or passing the
money were convicted. An attorney was brought to trial and
sentenced for what the court and jury adjudged to be his part
in the conspiracy. Through the closely knit efforts of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the police and other law
enforcement bodies of a number of states, twenty persons were
sentenced to prison, including six life sentences.
In this respect, may I add that the conviction record of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation remains at its high average. Only six persons out of 100 go free, once they enter a
courtroom charged by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
with a Federal offense. Ninety-four per cent of them are convicted.
Speaking of convictions and penitentiaries, I hope that
we never shall lose sight of the fact that a law enforcement
officer's greatest problem often arises at the very time when it
should end, namely, when he sees a prisoner taken out of a
courtroom for a term in prison. Unhappily for us, prisons
all too often form a springboard toward major criminality,
only a more or less pleasant meeting place where new crimes
can be concocted for commission when, as and if a sentimental
or otherwise expedient board or person with powers of clemency grants freedom for a new assault upon the peace and dignity of our citizens. This amounts to a national scandal.
Escapes are often so easily arranged as to be almost humorous,
did not the tragical element predominate. Prisons are being
emptied by unreasonable exercise of the power to send warped
and dangerous mentalities forth to freedom and to prey upon
communities. Through this exercise of clemency the lawabiding person becomes all but powerless to escape the predatory actions of vicious human vultures, who are aided and
abetted in their careers of destruction by persons swayed by
political, sentimental, or monetary reasons.
I sincerely hope that we of law enforcement may remain
diligently militant in our efforts to eradicate this most unsightly blot upon American civilization. It seems inconceiv-
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able that blood-crazed men should be allowed to receive
knives, guns, ammunition and even arsenals by which to murder their way to freedom from so-called escape-proof jails, and
then carry on a new career of plunder and slaughter. It seems
beyond the range of human conception that boards of clemency should meet in secret sessions, and undo, with the stroke
of a pen, the work of fearless law enforcement officers, the
judgment of honest and efficient courts, the desires of the
American populace itself, and throw open prison doors to
hordes of sneering, desperate convicts whose sole purpose is
again to flaunt the law. I do not speak of a few isolated cases,
as the easy-freedom advocates would have us believe. I speak
from the authenticity of a diligent search through the more
than five million five hundred thousand fingerprints in the
Identification Division which show thousands upon thousands of cases in which hardened convicts and old offenders
are repeatedly turned loose to pursue their criminal and degenerate desires. Should they again be apprehended, convicted
and sentenced, the angels of mercy who so love freedom for
convicts and who so forget the innocent and suffering public,
will gently minister to their every desire and soon again throw
the locks that will usher them forth to freedom.
I do not desire to be misunderstood upon this matter of
parole. I certainly favor parole for the proper persons. However, I shall resist in every possible manner the continuation
of parole for convicts who have shown no desire whatever to
proceed upon a path that will lead them into the ranks of
good citizens. Certainly, if he deserves it, a man should receive one parole. When he fails to make good on that parole,
he should automatically cancel any right to further clemency,
and it is the violation of this straight problem of common
sense that arouses the indignation of every honest law enforcement official in America.
May we work in close cooperation toward the common
goal when there shall be a new day in our efforts toward the
eradication of crime, when the task of enforcing laws shall be
a career hedged about and protected by every possible bulwark
that citizens can erect. May we look upon the day when it is
no longer possible for a politician to whisper to a court or jury
and bring about freedom for a guilty man. May we see the
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day when technicalities have been wiped out of criminal court
procedure, when witnesses may no longer feel the intimidation
of gangsters or of gangster attorneys. I hope we may look
forward to the day when the law enforcement official is paid
a salary commensurate with his efforts and at the fading of the
trail, may he be granted the honor, respect and remuneration
due him as a reward for long and valiant service in the interests of honesty, and the peace and happiness and safety of
America.
I thank you.
U. S. SUPREME COURT HAS FIRST CASE ON
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
ON ITS DOCKET
An appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas on a
case to suppress unauthorized practice of the law, has been docketed in
the Supreme Court of the United States.
The question may turn not on the alleged practice of law on part
of a credit men's association, however, but as to whether a state court
could properly interfere with the association's activity in relation to cases
in bankruptcy.
The Kansas Court found the Wichita Association of Credit Men
was guilty of unlawful practice of law in four particulars:
1. In collecting claims by preparing and filing suitsand intervening petitions, although the actual conduct of litigation was placed in
attorney's hands if collection could not be effected.
2. In collecting the fees for attorneys' service in such cases, retaining part of the fees before settling with the lawyers.
3. In soliciting claims and powers of attorney in bankruptcy
cases, electing the association manager as trustee, and collecting- claims
turned over to it by the manager-trustee.
4. Conducting liquidations for business firms without bankruptcy, handling and adjusting their claims, furnishing contract forms
and giving advice in connection with the liquidations.
The appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court is questioned on the ground
that the Supreme Court of Kansas had no jurisdiction over the activities
of the credit men's association pertaining to proceedings in bankruptcy.
It is the contention of the association that it could not legally be deprived
of compensation as provided in its contracts with various members for
attempting to make collections prior to litigation.
PAGE 0. ROY COHEN!
Easter Lily is a defendant in a recent J. P. case. It's a "he" and he
is a "gen'mun ob color."

JUDGE DENISON AND THE COLORADO CODE
By R. HICKMAN WALKER, of the Denver Bar
Ex-associate Justice, Supreme Court, State of Colorado

JOHN

H. DENISON, graduate of the University of Vermont, and of the Harvard Law School, a member of the
Denver Bar since 1881, a judge of the Denver District
Court for six years, a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court
for ten years, one being as Chief Justice, professor of pleading
at Denver Law School for 35 years, and occasional lecturer at
other schools as well as writer upon the subject, was attracted,
throughout his long and fruitful career, by the logical qualities of the unemotional field of legal pleading, studied in that
field critically and constructively, and, in addition to the less
tangible influences of his labors as practitioner, teacher and
nisi prius judge, left permanent contributions to that branch
of adjective law, in his decisions from the Supreme bench and
his book now near publication, entitled "Code Pleading in
Colorado." In ten years as a Supreme Justice, he wrote the
opinion of the court in nearly 600 cases, and of these, approximately 160 dealt, in whole or in part, with questions of Code
pleading and practice. In "Code Pleading in Colorado," due
to issue this week from the Courtright press, Judge Denison,
who corrected the final copy just before his death in the fall
of 1935, leaves to the Bar of Colorado-and I think the Bar
of the English-speaking world will also claim a share in the
legacy-a volume of 750 pages, carrying citations of 2500
different Colorado cases, with concise text, critical comment
and illustrative forms, incarnating the productive labors of a
lifetime,"Of his practice, the dearest issue,
And of his old experience, the only darling."
Of the book, let me say that it is what the publisher
claims it to be, a monumental work, and especially when one
considers that the subject matter and its citations are limited
to the single jurisdiction of Colorado. In his preface, dated
October 9th, 1935, Judge Denison says that the object of the
book is to show "what Code pleading is in Colorado and
what it logically ought to be,"-a wide gap indeed. This
object he pursues through 66 chapters, combining the methods of textbook, encyclopedia and digest, descending to the
151
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minutest detail and rising to the broadest principle in the
treatment of every conceivable question involving pleadings,
motions, types of action (not, however, including practice),
that has arisen in Colorado, embracing also special and statutory proceedings. Moreover, he supplies 100 forms. The
work bears the impress of his unmistakable talent for condensation, and the style is that frugal, inornate one which
made the syllabus of many of his opinions in the Supreme
Court almost as long as the opinion itself. And everywhere
present in the book is Denison, the relentless analyst, Denison,
the legal antiquarian, Denison, the thorough scholar, and
Denison, the candid.
On the Supreme bench, Judge Denison had a commonlaw mind, and a Code conscience. The Code he regarded as
having the effect of law. In his opinions, I find no trace of
the theory, later prominent upon that bench, that the Code is
persuasive, but not binding-that it is an elaborate suggestion from an impotent, if not impertinent, source. On the
contrary, Judge Denison remarks, in Williams vs. Stringfield
(76 Colorado 343), almost naively, one would say: "However that may be, the Code must govern us." Wondering,
apparently, if the courts would not obey the Code, how could
lawyers be expected to. Not only did he regard it as law, but,
while he did not regard it as ideal, neither did he consider it an
ideal, like Christian precepts, to be satisfied by a loose approximation. He read in the Code, as plainly as if in terms therein
expressed, from its prescription for "facts constituting the
cause of action," and for "ordinary concise language," and
from its definition of a "material allegation," and of "issues,"
and from its general scheme, the cardinal rule that only ultimate facts are to be pleaded, to the strict exclusion of evidentiary matter and conclusions of law. This was to him the key
of the arch, and upon violators of this rule, almost equal in
number to the membership of the Colorado Bar, he fell with
cold and incisive fury. The disregard of this rule he attributes, in his book, in part to the influence of Judge Victor A.
Elliott, who, first upon the Denver district and afterwards on
the Supreme bench, favored the use, under the Code, of the
equity methods of pleading for disclosure, rather than the
common law method of pleading for issue-which latter
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Denison says was clearly the Code object in all classes of cases.
Against the pleading of evidentiary matter, conclusions of
law, argument, hope and what not, he is able in his book to
cite an astonishing array of Supreme and Court of Appeals
decisions or dicta, and, whether he cites them all or not I do
not know, but he might include in the list no less than twenty-five of his own opinions in which he fulminates against
this universal vice, with growing impatience and gathering
despair, exclaiming in 77 Colo., "It is an elementary rule of
pleading-a rule more often ignored than obeyed, but a rule,"
and, in 80 Colo., "We are tired of citing the Colorado authorities on this point-they begin with Sylvis v. Sylvis, 11 Colorado." The rules of statement, given constant lip-service, had
hung for years like the birch on the wall, more in terror than
in use, but Denison took the rod down and began gleefully to
lay about him among the spoiled and now amazed children.
In his second year on the Supreme bench, he found no obscure
offender in Adams and Gast, of Pueblo, and because, instead
of pleading that the plaintiff and defendant made a contract,
or that the defendant, in consideration, etc., undertook and
promised (approved forms unquestioned for centuries, Denison says), they pleaded that the plaintiff made to defendant a
proposition (stating it), and the defendant accepted it, Denison affirms a judgment against them on the pleadings, disregarding also their supplications for trial, upon denials of
conclusions of law and denials of anticipated defenses. (Swanson Co. vs. Investment Co., 70 Colo. 83.) On the day
Swanson Co. vs. Opera House Co. was handed down, the
law of pleading in Colorado was a living thing. Yet Judge
Denison was candid enough to admit that when the judicial spectroscope was trained on a complaint, it was not
always easy to say which allegations lay within the spectrum
of ultimate fact and which ran over into the infra-red of
evidence on one side and which into the ultra-violet of legal
conclusions on the other. He was driven early to say that
"perhaps the only way to determine what is ultimate fact
is by precedent," (67 Colo. 315)-a view which he expands
in his book. He did his part toward establishing precedent
in this regard. In fact, with a keen and well-founded apprehension of the richness of the field to be cultivated, he
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was not at all averse from the didactic in his deliverances
upon questions of pleadings. In a score of instances, he sends
the bar, as well as its unlucky exponent in the particular
case, to Chitty or Archbold or Estes, or, in many cases, furnishes the language and the form in extenso, for whole complaints or defenses, as well as for particular allegations and
denials, and often sends the case back for complete repleading.
If your action is in replevin, conversion, deceit, quiet title,
contract, trespass to land or goods, seizure of exempt property, automobile negligence, alienation, criminal conversation,
Denison has done your work for you, if you will only let him,
in 65 to 85 Colorado, besides furnishing you innumerable
ultimate fact sentences and phrases. In doing so, his clipped
style results in some arresting sentences, as where, in Foley vs.
Gavin (76 Colo. 287), he says: "Marriage is an ultimate
fact,"-in defiance, it would seem, of divorce statistics.
Judge Denison, notwithstanding he was thoroughly
grounded in common-law pleading and had an intense admiration for its insistence upon accurate analysis and uniformity
of statement, and that his reputation in that regard extended
as far as England, did not, in the Code Canaan, or, if you
prefer, the Code Wilderness, put in much time sighing for the
fleshpots of the discarded system. In his book, he says that
lawyers have made the Code less simple than it really. is.
Neither in his book nor in his opinions, will you find any
encomiums upon the Code, such as you will find in Pomeroy,
whom Denison loved to cite. Nevertheless, the abolition of
forms of actions, and of the distinctions between legal and
equitable proceedings, Denison accepts ungrudgingly. In 74
Colorado (Clay R. Co. vs. Martinez, at page 10), he says,
arguendo, "To hold otherwise would be to revert to commonlaw forms of action now happily abolished." We cannot suspect him of satire. In 78 Colorado (Ry. Conductors vs.
Jones, at page 88), in holding it was no error for the trial
court to refuse to rule whether an action was legal or equitable, he emphasizes that the evidence and the rules of evidence
are the same, and asks, evidently in a skeptical moment, "If
the Code has not abolished the label, what has it abolished?"
adding, "We should stultify it." In Conroy vs. Cover (80
Colo. 434), now grown into a leading case, he maintained,
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under Code provisions and with an invocation of the spirit of
the Code, not unusual with him, the right of the court to
grant relief to certain of the cestuis que trustent, notwithstanding the absence from the jurisdiction of others of them
who, if present, would be indispensable parties. Many, indeed, are his liberal rulings, in the interest of substantial justice, where logic-a dominating factor in his mind-might
have wrought a different result; as where he refused to give
fatal effect to a corporate misnomer (66 Colo. 173), or to the
absence of a replication, where the issue was treated as existing
(68 Colo. 244), or to a variance (80 Colo. 325), or to the
absence of an essential allegation in the complaint, where the
answer nevertheless denied it, and evidence was taken regarding it (80 Colo. 26), where he upheld a complaint in the
nature of an interpleader, but not within the literal language
of the Code (74 Colo. 452), ruled that a mandamus to issue
70 different tax certificates stated but one cause of action (80
Colo. 325), rejected the metaphysical axiom that you cannot
amend where there is nothing to amend by, and allowed an
action against a dissolved corporation to proceed against the
last acting board (82 Colo. 343), and ruled a plea of "unclean hands" unnecessary to the enforcement of that doctrine
by the court, for whose integrity it was a shield (82 Colo.
75). The spirit of the Code was strong upon him and even
his clinging to the common-law types of statement, his insistence upon the value of precedented forms, his continual use of
the common-law nomenclature, as assumpsit, trespass de
bonis, etc., were designed to prevent the seeds of destruction
which lay in the body of the Code from coming to growth
and harvest. For Judge Denison saw clearly-and in his book
he puts beyond misunderstanding-that a system of pleading
can be of no substantial service to the cause of justice if it
licenses every pleader and every court, under a rule for the
statement of facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary
concise language, to make his own selection, "out of his own
head," as Judge Denison put it-of the ultimate facts, and
the concise and ordinary language-more certain to be ordinary than to be concise-for their statement, so that an identical transaction is, for one pleader, stated as A, for another as
B, and for another as all the letters of the alphabet. He saw,
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with equal clearness, that the so-called common-law classifications of forms of action were not such at all, but were categories of causes of action, as trespass de bonis was an unlawful
taking of goods, though no action were ever brought on it,
and consequently, under the Code, a statement of a trespass de
bonis was just as good a statement of a cause of action as before the Code. As statements of such causes of action, approved and uniform, were available, he welcomed them as
exact compliances with the Code, and as furnishing to the
Code some protection against the tendency to utterly diverse,
ruggedly individualistic, and unsorted pleadings which the
Code, in the hands of a profession not yet universally logical
or analytical, had developed. In his book, he tends to despair:
"Since the Code has thus far failed in its purpose to produce conciseness and directness in pleading and must continue to do so unless
lawyers and courts shall develop customary forms of brevity and directness, which seems but remotely possible, it appears that the best course
would be to adopt the English system; if not wholly at least partially,
i.e.,
in all ordinary cases."

The English system referred to, of course, provides for simple
statements of claim and defense, in language prescribed by the
rule of court, non-demurrable, and leading directly to trial.
Judge Denison would be interested to see-perhaps I should
follow Brisbane and say, Judge Denison will be interested to
see-to what scheme or system the Supreme Court of the
United States, and its advisory committee, now formulating
rules for all civil cases in the Federal district courts, will resort
-a result to be known within a few months, and certain to
be of immense importance in the future development of American pleading.
It is not every jurisdiction the size of Colorado which
produces a matter in any, let alone in so difficult, a department
of the law. In closing, permit me to apostrophize: "Oh,
gentle and guileless spirit, wheresoever in the realms of the
unembodied you now employ that steely and syllogistic mind
upon ultimate fact indeed, be not disturbed to think that we
still make of our complaint our opening statement and of our
replication a closing argument, and anticipate defenses, and
make argumentative denials, and neglect the sweet and commendable common counts. It may be that your 'Code Plead-
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ing in Colorado' will furnish bench and bar the very instrument needed to develop a homogeneous, logical and practicable system of pleading in this tiny mundane jurisdiction,
and thus may so right a genius as yours find full posthumous
vogue.
"SCINTILLATING OMNILUCENCE"
(Journal, American Judicature Society, April, 1936)

A few months ago it was said in this Journal that opposition to
bar integration had been driven to cover; that hostile arguments rarely
appeared in print; and that opponents had retired to the last line of
defense-personal influence with legislators. Shortly after that statement was made there appeared in Dicta, the Denver Bar Association's
sprightly journal (Dec., 1935), an apparently serious argument against
integration. Like all similar arguments it was essentially a priori argument. The writer, Mr. Albert M. Vogl, told of all the evil consequences which would follow compulsory organization. This line of
argument becomes increasingly difficult as the years go by without evidence that any loss whatsoever has come through integration. It has
to ignore all that is pertinent evidence, the history of the state bars
which have been in existence for three years or more.
But the article was notable in introducing a new comparison and
a fresh expression. The author called inclusive organization an effort
to substitute "Boeotian mediocrity for scintillating omnilucence." Such
a phrase is one to be studied, mastered and enshrined in one's inner consciousness. It affords spiritual release in a time of doubt and fear. To
pave the way to appreciation of a linguistic jewel (for "omnilucence"
does not appear in the latest American lexicon) it may be spelled thusomni-lucence-and so explain itself. ("Shining upon all or every.
where," New English Dictionary, Oxford.) One can learn from
Webster that Boeotia was a land in which the natives were notorious
for their stupidity.
Having mastered this expression with a proper sense of achievement, the only question that remains is whether Mr. Vogl has been
kidding his readers. In the succeeding number Dicta published an
affirmative argument, written by Mr. Bentley M. McMullin. Did the
editor of Dicta, in order to present both sides of a question which Colorado lawyers are at last beginning to consider earnestly, assign the
negative to a writer who was willing to comply and do the best he
could?* Such an attitude would be more or less routine to a lawyer.
But the coinage of bright and shining new phrases is not routine-it is
inspiration.
*Oh, Mister! you don't know our Albert Vogl!

WILLS--PUBLIC

POLICY-REPUGNANT

PROVISIONS-APPEALABLE

Executor vs. Clarke, et al.-No. 13733Decided February 24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The will of Viola A. Clarke provided, "In case my son, Eugene
W. Clarke's present wife is dead, or has otherwise ceased to be his wife"
that the said son was to have one-third of the estate. There was a
further provision that "In case my son Eugene W. Clarke's wife is still
living and is still his wife at the time of my death, then I hereby, give,
devise and bequeath to my son, Eugene W. Clarke, $5,000.00 and no
more."
The District Court held these provisions in the will void as
contrary to public policy and repugnant to public morals and as tending
to interfere with the marital relation. The question is also raised as
to whether an executor who files a petition for construction of a will
where there is no contest or caveat over the will has an appealable
interest in the matter.
1. The provisions in the will with reference to the devises and
bequeaths to the son are valid and are not contrary to public policy,
nor repugnant to public morals.
2. The executor had the right to file a petition for a construction
as to the terms and validity of the will and is entitled to have an adverse
decision reviewed in the Supreme Court. It was not necessary that a
caveat or contest be filed. Proceedings to review an adverse decision of
the lower court lies not only where a caveat or contest is filed against
a will, but also an adverse decision on a petition for construction of the
terms of the will.
3. On the latter question the decisiori of the Supreme Court was
unanimous, but on the first question of the validity of the devises and
bequeaths to the son, Mr. Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr.
INTEREST--Clarke as

Justice Holland dissent.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC UTILITIES-ELECTRIC POWER
-METHOD
OF ESTABLISHING RATE-The Glenwood Light and

Water Company et al. vs. City of Glenwood Springs-No.
13641-DecidedMarch 2, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
The Public Service Company owns a hydroelectric generating
plant seven miles from Glenwood Springs. The Glenwood Light and
Water Company is a public utility owning a hydroelectric plant at
Glenwood Springs operated by water used by the city and supplies electric current to the citizens of Glenwood Springs. The Glenwood Light
and Water Company is unable to furnish sufficient current at peak
demand and purchases additional current from the Public Service Company. Prior to 1926, the Glenwood Company owned the transmission
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line from the city limits to the plant of the Public Service Company and
purchased current delivered at the plant and assumed the line loss in
transit. In 1926 the Public Service Company rebuilt the line under
contract with the Glenwood Company whereby the Public Service
Company was to have sole ownership of the first mile leading from the
plant and the balance of the line was to remain the property of the
Glenwood Company and the Public Service Company was given a 20year lease on that part of the line retained by the Glenwood Company
and was to pay therefor $20.00 a year and taxes, patrol and maintain
it and deliver current at the city limits or city gate of Glenwood Springs.
The Public Service Company was to have the use of this part of the
line as a part of its transmission line supplying a number of towns, all
lying beyond Glenwood Springs, in which it served consumers directly.
Early in the year 1933, complaint being made to the Public Utilities Commission that the rates charged by the Glenwood Company were
excessive, and in the course of the proceedings evidence relative to the
value of the properties was offered. One of the considerations being as
to whether or not the value of the 5.28 miles of transmission lines leased
should be included in the valuation in determining the rate basis. The
commission held that it should be included.
In the District Court on review of the commission's findings, the
District Court held that such value was improperly included in the rate
base.
1. The test of whether the value of any given property shall be
included in the rate base of a public utility i's whether it is used and
useful in supplying the commodity or service that the utliity has undertaken to furnish. If it is used and useful it is properly included; if not,
it must be excluded.
2. Property may be owned by a utility, but if it is not used by
or useful to it in fulfilling its obligations to the public then such property cannot be included in the base for rate-making purposes.
3. A utility may lease property and if it is used by it and useful
in carrying out its obligations to the public, the rental paid for such
property is a proper overhead charge to be borne by the utility customers, and to be equitably allocated to them.
4. There is no conflict in the evidence as to the use of the line
and the evidence failed to show the line in question to be used by, and
useful to, the Glenwood Company and the Public Utilities Commission
exceeded its jurisdiction in permitting the valuation of the line in question to be included in the rate base.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents.
MINING RIGHTS-UNPATENTED OVERLAPPING CLAIMS-LANDLORD
AND TENANT-ESTOPPEL-Kenney vs. Eccer-No. 13615-

Decided February 24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Action for possession of and to quiet title to unpatented mining
claims. The defendants' location, dated June 10, 1930, covered land
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previously located by the plaintiffs' grantors on which plaintiffs had
failed to keep their location alive by failure to do required assessment
work prior to the location made by defendants. A lease dated June 18,
1930, was granted by plaintiffs to defendants covering a patented claim
and included the unpatented claims of the plaintiffs.
The real issue was whether defendants were estopped from making
their location as against the plaintiffs by reason of having accepted the
lease and taken possession which arose out of the relation of landlord
and tenant.
HELD: *That plaintiffs had failed, at their peril, to keep their locations alive, that the land was open to location when located by defendants, that the trial court determined that the defendants were in possession under such location made on land open to location before the
relation of landlord and tenant existed, that the defendants were not
estopped by subsequently entering into such relationship, and that there
was not sufficient evidence to justify disturbing the findings of the trial
court.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Burke, sitting for Mr. Chief Justice Campbell, and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
DEEDS-BOUNDARY LINES ESTABLISHED BY PAROL AGREEMENTCONFLICTING EVIDENCE-Eisele vs. Barnhart-No.1365 2-Decided February 24, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Barnhart contracted to sell Eisele a tract of land described as "The
A surveyor was
south one acre of block numbered eighteen (18)."
called in and fixed the northerly boundary line. Eisele then constructed
a permanent fence on that boundary line. Barnhart then built a new
house north of Eisele's property on what was supposed to be her own
property. The deed conveying the property also called for "The south
one acre of block numbered eighteen (18) ." Barnhart then offered her
new property for sale and then found out that, if Eisele owned one
acre, the north boundary line of Eisele's property would go through
the center of Barnhart's new house so Barnhart asked Eisele for a quitclaim deed for a thirty foot strip. Eisele then discovering that he didn't
have one acre of land, tore down the permanent fence which he had
erected and put up a sign on Barnhart's house. Trial court entered
judgment for Barnhart.
HELD: Affirmed. The law is that under certain circumstances, a
boundary line may be permanently and irrevocably established by a
parol agreement of adjoining owners. Where the agreement is executed
and actual possession is taken under such agreement, it is conclusive
against the owners and those claiming under them. The conflicting
evidence in this case was resolved by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff and that is binding on this court.--Judgment affirmed.
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INSURANCE-CONTRACT TERMS-DEFINITION OF WORD "IMMEDI-

ATELY"-George Leonard Reed vs. The Massachusetts Bonding &
Insurance Company, a Corporation-No.13725-Decided Februw

ary 24, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
FACTS: Plaintiff sued upon accident insurance policy issued by
defendant providing for payments in specified amounts in the event that
plaintiff should sustain an injury by accidental means, "if such injury

shall immediately, continuously and wholly disable and prevent the

insured from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his
occupation." The uncontradicted testimony shows that plaintiff sustained an injury by accidental means on August 3, 1933, but was able
to perform the duties pertaining to his occupation until November 23,
1933, when he became wholly disabled and remained so until the date
of the commencement of the action. The medical testimony in the case
was to the effect that the disability followed directly from the accidental
hurt, within such time as the processes of nature consumed in bringing
about the disability. Trial was had to a jury and at the conclusion
of all the evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict, upon the
ground that the evidence affirmatively showed that the disability was
not immediate. The trial court granted the motion and directed a verdict for defendant.
HELD: The word "immediately," as applied to the facts in this
case, is a word of causation and not of time. To hold that the intervening of time while the processes of nature were developing broke the
continuity of the results of the accident, would be equivalent to saying
that no time may be allowed for the development of a disability directly
traceable to an accident. If nature set up these processes instantly after
the accident, as apparently it did in this case, then the disability was
immediate, notwithstanding the fact that it did not disable the insured
until after the lapse of more than 100 days.
The court erred in directing a verdict. The judgment is reversed
and the cause remanded.
Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Burke, and Mr. Justice Bouck
dissent.
ATTACHMENT--GARNISHMENT--CONTRACT FOR WORK-NOTICEANSWER OF GARNISHEE-EFFECT OF-Meyer vs. The Delta

Market-No. 13869-Decided March 16, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Young.
One Martinez became indebted to the Delta Market for groceries.
The Delta Market brought suit and sued out an attachment and served
a garnishee summons on John Clark, his employer. The field man of
the Holly Sugar Company, before the wages were earned, told one
Meyer, a grocer, that if he would let Martinez have groceries the company would write in Meyer's name as a payee on any checks from it to
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Martinez so that Meyer would be protected in the payment for groceries so sold.
1. The Delta Market at the time of the service of the garnishee
summons had a superior right to Meyer and judgment against the
garnishee was properly entered.
2. While there was a contract between the employer and the
sugar company to furnish labor there was no absolute obligation so to
do and there was no evidence that the plaintiff had any notice of any
arrangement to write Meyer's name in the check nor did Martinez
authorize the company to make any checks for money due him payable
to him and Meyer jointly.
3.
There was no agreement on the part of the sugar company to
pay Meyer for groceries furnished to Martinez, of which plaintiff is
required to take cognizance. The employment was directly between
Martinez and his employer and the employer had no agreement with
Meyer to protect him.
4. The trial court had no power to require Meyer to endorse the
check and the check came into existence after the garnishee summons was
served.-Judgment in favor of plaintiff affirmed, except as to that part
in which Meyer is required to endorse the check.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-RESPONSIBILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS-McIntosh vs. The City and
County of Denver-No. 13737-Decided March 16, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
McIntosh was convicted in police court of vagrancy, carrying concealed weapons and impersonating an officer. On appeal to the county
court he was found guilty of vagrancy only upon proceedings in error
in the Supreme Court. Judgment was reversed on the ground that the
evidence was wholly insufficient to sustain the charge. McIntosh then
brought suit against the City and County of Denver for damages for
malicious prosecution. Demurrer was sustained to his complaint on the
ground that the city was not liable for the acts of the officers and
employees.
1. To sustain an action for malicious prosecution, malice and
want of probable cause must concur.
2. The reversal by the Supreme Court of the conviction of vagrancy does not in itself prove want of probable cause. Probable cause
for arrest may exist without sufficient evidence to sustain a charge based
thereon.
3. The city is a corporate entity and as such could entertain no
malicious intent and officers in making the arrest and prosecuting the
case were acting in carrying out their duties of a public nature and not
in the sense that they were agents of the city and the relation of principal and agent under such circumstances does not exist and the city
therefore is not liable for their acts.-Judgment affirmed.
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PRACTICE-TREATING MOTION TO STRIKE AS DEMURRER-STATUTE

OF LIMITATIONS-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-LACHES-Barnes vs.

Spangler-No. 13742-Decided March 16, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Vera Spangler was engaged to marry James S. Willard's son. The
son died in 1910 and thereafter Miss Spangler went to live with the
father after the death of his wife, on oral agreement that he would give
her all of his property, and he executed a deed and thereafter his heirs
at law brought suit to cancel the deed on the ground of want of delivery. The court below held there was a valid delivery and on appeal to
the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed on the ground that there
was no valid delivery of the deed with a reservation that Miss Spangler
would not be deprived of any right or remedy against the estate, if any.
The cause was remanded for further proceedings and thereupon the
plaintiffs sought a decree cancelling the deed and awarding them possession and a judgment for the rents and profits to which an amended
answer was filed, more particularly setting out the oral contract whereby
she was to have the possession and ownership of the real estate. Plaintiffs moved to strike the amended answer, which was granted, and judgment was entered in their favor. Thereupon on a second appeal to the
Supreme Court judgment was reversed, holding that the trial court was
in error in striking the amended answer.
On a third trial the stricken amended answer having been reinstated, decree was entered quieting title to Miss Spangler.
1. The law of the case was established by the former decision of
the Supreme Court, it being therein settled that the allegations of the
answer and cross-complaint of defendant were sufficient to entitle her to
offer proof thereof.
2. This being so, nothing remained to be determined except the
truth of her allegations, and this was established to the satisfaction of
the trial court by ample competent evidence; consequently, it must stand.
3.
In determining the sufficiency of defendant's answer and crosscomplaint the Supreme Court considered the motion to strike as a demurrer and since it apparently was so treated, and while not customary,
the practice is permissible to so treat it.
4. The defense of the statute of frauds, the statute of limitations
and the doctrine of laches is not applicable. The alleged oral agreement
was entirely performed by defendant, and the evidence discloses a substantial partial performance by Willard, and an ill-advised attempt on
his part to fully perform. Against contracts in such a state of perform.
ance, the statute does not operate.
5. She was not guilty of laches because she was in possession by
virtue of the deed which she recorded and believed to be good and her
equitable remedy was not available and did not arise until the deed had
been set aside, whereupon came her discovery that Willard had not in a
legal way fully performed. This satisfies the question of laches.
6. The statute of limitations does not apply in an action to quiet

title.--Judgment affirmed.
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TRUSTS-CONVERSION-FOLLOWING FUNDS TO BE IMPRESSED WITH
THE TRUST--CaSS, as Administratrix vs. Blake et al.-No. 13537
-Decided March 16, 1936-Opinion by Mr. JusticeButler.
Maude B. Cass, as administratrix of the estate of Oscar D. Cass,
deceased, brought suit against the defendants in error, as individuals and
as trustees, alleging that the defendants had wrongfully converted certain
funds to which she was entitled, as evidenced by a certain written instrument, and also alleging that the converted funds and their proceeds had
been put in real estate known as the America Theatre property and into
the capital stock of Denver-America Theatre Company. Plaintiff sought
by her complaint to have the real estate and the stock impressed with a
trust. Judgment below held against the plaintiff.
1. Where different inferences may be drawn from the same state
of circumstances, it is the duty of the court to presume in favor of innocent conduct rather than of guilty misconduct or intentional wrong.
2.
Where a transaction is capable, under the evidence, of two
constructions, one that it is fair and honest, the other that it is unfair
or dishonest, the court should give the transaction the former construction.
3.
In this case, the transaction constituted a gift. The transaction being executed, the gift could not be revoked in whole or in part.
4.
The Acceptance Credit Corporation acquired absolute, unqualified title to the investment certificates, freed from all interests and
claims of Cass; that th certificates becarne assets of the company to the
same extent as its other assets; that the company had a lawful right to
use them for corporate purposes.
5. The company's use of the proceeds thereof in the acquisition
of the America Theatre property and the capital stock of Denver-America Theatre Company did not constitute a wrongful conversion of the
certificates and no constructive trust in favor of the plaintiff attached to
that property by reason of such use of the certificates, or the proceeds
thereof.-Judgment affirmed.
PLEADING-ACCOUNTING---MOTION TO STRIKE-DEMURRER-Clavel, as Administratrix v7s. Fougnier-No. 13881-Decided March
16, 1936--Opinio by Mr. Justice Hilliard.

This was suit for an accounting by an administratrix against one
alleged to be holding in trust property belonging to her intestate. The
court below struck portions of the complaint, ordered plaintiff to set

forth more definitely by amendment or bill of particulars the items of
property claimed, and then struck portions of the bill of particulars filed
in compliance with the order, and then sustained a demurrer to the complaint as amended and gave judgment of dismissal.
1. The matter stricken from the complaint as to the first fourteen items was proper, because the eliminated language was by way of

recital only and was not permissible.
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2. As to the remaining allegations stricken, however, these were
direct allegations alleging a trust and a failure to account and should not
have been stricken.
3. The paragraphs of the bill of particulars stricken should have
been retained. Considering the nature of the suit, the alleged relationship of defendant to the matter involved, and the representative capacity
of plaintiff, the excluded allegations were pertinent. They tended to
explain the difficulties under which plaintiff labored in attempting to
comply with the court's order to make the complaint more definite and
certain and they amplify the allegations in the complaint, of which they
became a part. The complaint as amended by the bill of particulars is
free from ambiguity, and states a cause of action. The charge, shortly
stated, is that plaintiff's decedent had given into defendant's keeping in
trust, to be accounted for, substantial properties for which she did not
account while the trustor lived, and that she refuses to account therefor
to the representative of his estate. This stated the cause of action.Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Bouck not participating.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-POWER OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW TO REVERSE THE FINDINGS WITHOUT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE-Mishmish et al. v's. Hayden Coal Com-

pany et al.-No. 13884-Decided March 9, 1936--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Young.
Mishmish was awarded $3,640 by the Industrial Commission for
permanent partial disability. The District Court vacated and set aside
the award.
The Industrial Commission first made a finding that the claimant
suffered no permanent disability after a certain date and that any disability after that time was due to miner's consumption and that such
condition had not been aggravated or accelerated by the injury and compensation was denied. On petition for review the Industrial Commission entered a supplemental award for compensation on account of
permanent partial disability, principally on the ground that it had improperly weighed the evidence in its former decision and that its former
order was an error and should be vacated. The question involved is
whether or not the commission acted without and in excess of its powers
in vacating its former award in which it found there was no permanent
injury and entering an award finding permanent injury on the ground
that it improperly weighed the evidence.
1. The reason assigned by the commission in its later award that
it had improperly weighed the evidence in its former award was sufficient ground for entering a new award; particularly where in the former
finding it reserved jurisdiction of the claim until the same was finally
closed.
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The Section 4472, Compiled Laws 1921, does not specifically

provide that additional testimony shall be taken on review.

The evi-

dent purpose of this section is to prevent court dockets from being cumbered with cases before the commission has had full opportunity to correct its own errors. To hold that on such review the commission is

without power to do other than affirm its former finding and award
would be to make the statute meaningless and a review futile.
3. It is the duty of the Industrial Commission as a fact-finding
body to properly weigh the evidence in arriving at its conclusion. If on
a further consideration of the evidence after a petition to review had been
filed they were convinced that they had improperly weighed the evidence, it was their duty to properly weigh the evidence and make findings of fact and enter an award in accordance with such findings.Judgment reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating.
JUDGMENT - CORPORATIONS - FRAUD - APPLICATION OF STOCKHOLDER TO VACATE JUDGMENT-Hartzler vs. Russell Gulch

Smelting Company-No. 13731-Decided March 9, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
A minority stockholder filed a petition to intervene and set aside
a judgment rendered against the corporation, Gold King Mining Company, alleging that the Pittsburg Consolidated Mining Company transferred certain mining claims to the Gold King Mining Company in consideration of 150,000 shares of stock which was the sole consideration,
but in pursuance of the conspiracy and without consideration at the
same time executed and delivered promissory notes aggregating $15,000,
and in furtherance of the conspiracy that the Gold King Mining Company confessed judgment and made no defense and that as a result judgment was entered, execution issued and sale of the Gold King Mining
Company mining claims pursuant to levy had taken place and certificate
to that effect issued.
The trial court dismissed the petition to intervene.
1. Where it is alleged in the petition of intervention that the
notes sued on were without consideration and that those in control of
the sued company failed to defend and actively authorized entry of
judgment and that any request by petitioner upon the controlling agents
of the corporationto defend the action would have been futile, the petitioner should have been permitted to intervene and defend.
2. The allegations in the petition of intervention constituted a
defense to the action if true.
3. The judgment against the Gold King Mining Company
should have been vacated. The execution recalled levy and sale set aside
and leave granted to petitioner to answer and defend the action.
4. The affidavits presented in opposition to the petition are not
material.--Judgmentreversed.

